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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), and by Rules 3, and 4, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Petitioner and Appellee, Judith Wanda Lowry, and the
Respondent and Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, were married in the City of
Dalton within the State of Massachusetts, on August 20, 1960. The parties
were married in the LDS Temple and remained married for over forty-three
(43), years. (R. 1, 40, Tr. 3, 8/15/05 Tr. 4)
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Four (4), children were born as issue of the Petitioner and the
Respondent. All of the parties' children are adults and are fully emancipated
and are not dependent upon the parties for their support. (R. 2).
The Petitioner retired from the Shepard Montana School District in
1994, and receives retirement therefrom in the sum of One Hundred Eighty
Dollars Seventy-three Cents ($180.73), per month. She also receives Social
Security income at the time of trial in the sum of Six Hundred Thirty-five
Dollars ($635.00), per month, but this sum has been reduced by Seventythree Dollars ($73.00), per month since trial and she now receives Social
Security income of Five Hundred Sixty-two Dollars ($562.00), per month.
(Tr. 4, 8; 8/15/05 Tr. 5, Exhibits 2 & 4)
The Petitioner is completely disabled.

She has had six (6), foot

surgeries resulting from peripheral neuropathy, is in need of further surgeries
and suffers in continuous pain. The Petitioner has also had surgery fusing
the vertebrae in her neck causing the Petitioner continuous pain.

The

Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in present need of cataract surgery.
(Tr. 18-22).
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Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in present need of cataract surgery.
(Tr. 18-22).
Becky Torgerson was subpoenaed by the Petitioner to testify as to the
Petitioner's complete disability but was released from the subpoena at trial
because the parties stipulated that the Petitioner was completely disabled
(Tr. 43, Exhibit 6, R. 166). The Petitioner is receiving both physical therapy
and other therapy, and the copay cost thereof is One Hundred Twenty
Dollars ($120.00), per month. (Exhibit 6).
The Respondent receives Social Security income in excess of One
Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per month. (Tr. 4). The
Respondent deposited into the parties' joint bank account funds from his
retirement account and his social security from June, 2003, through April,
2004, the eleven (11), months prior to the parties' separation, the sum of
$42, 265.35, which averages $3,842.30, per month. These deposits did not
include his income from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the
Petitioner's social security and retirement income. (Exhibit 8).
The Respondent deposited income from Century 21, into the State
Bank of Southern Utah and Zions Bank during the parties' marriage. On
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a commission of
$27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited into his personal
account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and that all of the funds in this
account were his. (Exhibit 18, R. 162-163). The Respondent had also
deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at Zions Bank.
(Exhibit 8). Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from Order to
show Cause Hearing ordered the division of these accounts reserved for trial
and any amounts withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount
awarded at the time of trial. (R. 49, 171). The Petitioner was paid a lump
sum payment of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing
upon her order to show cause. The monies in the accounts were marital
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage from
commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where he had been
employed since 2002. (Exhibits 10, 18, 31).
The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had stints placed in his
heart and has other medical problems.

The Respondent is presently

employed as a real estate agent at Century 21, in St. George, Utah. His
adjusted gross income from his 1099, at Century 21 in the year 2004, was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Forty-seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-six Dollars Forty-three Cents
($47, 276.43), although one of the commissions earned by the Respondent in
the amount of Twenty-seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($27,600.00),
was an unusual event. The Respondent's average monthly income from
Century 21, alone for the year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine Hundred
Thirty-nine Dollars Seventy Cents ($3,939.70). (Exhibits 10, 18, 31, Tr. 33,
61,R. 166).
The Respondent suffers from coronary and renal artery disease
barring him from full time work. If the Respondent could work full time his
income would be Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00), per
month. The Respondent, on November 1, 2005, was only capable of parttime work.

The Respondent's health is in a changing status.

The

Respondent, on November 1, 2005, was capable of earning Two Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), per month. (Tr. 22-26, R. 166).
The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three Thousand Three
Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89), per month.

Her

monthly need for financial or spousal support from the Respondent
(following the deduction of her monthly social security and retirement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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income in the sum of $742.73) is Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-nine
Dollars Sixteen Cents ($2,489.16), per month. (Exhibit 27, R. 165-175).
The Petitioner and the Respondent purchased a residence and real
property in October, 2002, and during the marriage situate at 1020 East Fort
Pierce Drive in the City of St. George in the County of Washington within
the State of Utah. The purchase price of the parties' home and real property
was One Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00). U.S. Bank is
owed Eighty-two

Thousand

Forty-two Dollars

Seventy-one

Cents

($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the payment thereon is Six Hundred
Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per month. (Exhibit 12).
The Petitioner testified that the present fair market value of the marital
residence and real property at the time of trial was One Hundred Seventyfive Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00). (Tr. 45). The Respondent, Kenneth
Lowry, testified that the value of the marital residence was Two Hundred
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($215,000.0). (Tr. 44).
On February 24, 2005, Craig Morley, a licensed, certified and
accredited real estate appraiser of Morley & McConkie, L.C., performed an
appraisal of the marital residence and real property.

Mr. Morley was
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qualified as an expert witness as to the value of the parties' residence and
real property. Mr. Morley determined and testified that the fair market value
of the parties' residence and real property as of February 24, 2005, was One
Hundred Eighty-five Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00).

(Tr. 45-50).

Accordingly, the parties have just less than One Hundred Three Thousand
Dollars ($103,000.00), of equity in the marital residence and real property.
The Petitioner paid Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), from her separate
inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and real
property. (R. 166).
The Respondent has in his possession marital property which he took
with him at the time of separation.

These items include a refrigerator,

television, chest of drawers, laptop computer, lounging chairs, a green desk,
the barometer, a crystal chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2
shop vacuums, saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the marriage
including three (3), rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment. (R. 169-170).
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal property in
the possession of the other at the time of trial. The Petitioner and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

Respondent

acquired household furniture, fixtures, furnishings

and

appliances and other personal property during their marriage. (Exhibit 26, R.
69-70).
The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and stock benefits
during the parties' marriage presently held by American Funds. (Exhibit 7).
The Respondent deposited into a separate American Funds account
approximately $32,045.00, which he claimed he inherited from his father in
1999.

The Respondent and the Petitioner created this account with

American Funds in joint tenancy. (Exhibit 7, 7/16/04 Exhibit 3). Thereafter,
the Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup truck with said funds from
the joint American Funds account and this pickup truck was titled jointly
with the Petitioner. The Respondent later sold the pickup truck and placed
the proceeds of the sale into the American Funds account held in joint
tenancy with the Petitioner. The Respondent also added a portion of his
earnings during the marriage to this account. The funds in this account have
been commingled and have not remained the separate property of the
Respondent. (Tr. 95-96, R. 164-165).
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The Petitioner and the Respondent incurred a single marital debt, the
GMC credit card which was used for family purchases. (Exhibit 13, R. J65).
The Petitioner, Judith Wanda Lowry, had incurred court costs and
attorney fees through trial in the sum of $15,257.69. (R. 119-123).
The trial court directed counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent
to prepare their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and proposed
orders and judgments at the trial on March 1,2005; (Tr. 94-98, R. 124).
The Respondent, Kenneth Ray Lowry, submitted to the trial court the
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Respondent's Proposed Judgment Dividing Property and Liabilities on April
1,2005(# 144-147, 148-160);
On April 8, 2005, Petitioner submitted Objections to [Respondent's]
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 161-174);
On April 9, 2005, the Petitioner submitted her proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments to the trial court and to the
Respondent. On April 22, 2005, Respondent filed Objection to Petitioner's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 184-190, 194);
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On April 22, 2005, the Respondent filed his Response to Petitioner's
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
(R. 181-183);
On July 20, 2005, the Respondent filed his Motion to Terminate
Temporary Alimony (R. 242-243, 244-245);
On July 26, 2005, the trial court sent the parties' counsel notice of a
hearing upon the Respondent's Motion to Terminate Temporary Alimony
scheduling a hearing for August 15, 2005 (R. 247-248);
On August 15, 2005, the Petitioner and her counsel appeared before
the trial court pursuant to the notice given by the Court for hearing. The
Respondent and his counsel did not appear but had filed a motion to
continue the hearing. The trial court denied the Respondent's motion to
continue the hearing and made findings using the proposed findings,
conclusions and orders, and the objections to the proposed findings and
orders of both the Petitioner and the Respondent (8/1/05 Tr. 3-10);
On August 17, 2005, the Petitioner submitted Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments to the Respondent and the
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trial Court conforming to the findings and decisions of the trial court made
on August 15, 2005 (R. 280-281);
On August 25, 2005, the Respondent again filed his Objection to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments (R. 268269). The Respondent also filed his Motion to Reconsider Rulings claiming
he had been denied due process of law because he was not present at the
hearing scheduled by the Court for August 15, 2005, despite having received
notice of the hearing (R. 270-274);
On September 29, 2005, the trial court scheduled a hearing upon each
of the parties' proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments for November
1, 2005, and each parties' objections to the others documents. (R. 298-299);
On November 1, 2005 the trial court held a hearing upon the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and judgments proposed by the
Petitioner and the Respondent, and upon the parties objections to each others
proposed findings, conclusions and orders (R. 300, 11/01/05 Tr.1-12);
On November 3, 2005, the trial court mailed to counsel for the
Petitioner and the Respondent, the Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact
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and Conclusions of Law which the court had modified and handwritten
changes to the proposedfindings(Addendum A);
On November 17, 2005, the Petitioner's counsel mailed the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments, revised under the
direction of the trial court, to the Respondent and to the trial court. These
findings, conclusions, orders and judgments incorporated the changes the
trial court had directed the Petitioner's counsel make to the documents on
November 3,2005 (R. 303-327, 328-335);
The trial court signed and entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Orders and Judgments on November 21,2005 (303-327, 328-335);
On December 2, 2005, the Respondent filed his untimely Objection to
Petitioner Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments.
These objections were identical to the Respondent's objections and issues
previously considered by the trial court in the Respondent's and the
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and
judgments, and the objections filed by both parties to the other parties
proposed pleadings (338-343);
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On December 12, 2005, the Petitioner filed her Reply to Respondent's
Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and
Judgments asserting that the objections raised by the Respondent were the
same objections which the Respondent had raised twice before and which
had been resolved by the trial court on November 1, and 3, 2005, following
a hearing in the trial court upon the parties' proposed findings, and the
parties objections thereto. The Petitioner also asserted that the Respondent's
objections were untimely because they were not filed by November 25,
2005, eight days after thefindings,conclusions, orders and judgments were
submitted to the trial court and the Respondent on November 17, 2005
(R. 344-347); and
Rather than bringing the issue of his untimely and previously resolved
objections before the trial court for resolution the Respondent filed his
Notice of Appeal on December 9,2005 (R. 348-349).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Petitioner
should be affirmed. The appellant has failed to make a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindingsand has made no
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The Appellee
should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon this appeal
pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Mr. Lowry had his days in court. His objections were repeatedly
considered by the trial court and ruled upon thrice. He has not established
that he was deprived of a single item of his property. Mr. Lowry was
afforded, and re-afforded, due process of law. The trial court had heard his
position at trial, twice considered his objections to the findings, orders and
judgments and made modifications thereto based upon his objections.
The Respondent and Appellant's argument that his right of due
process under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 7, of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is without merit and is frivolous. He cites
no facts and no authority, nor makes an argument in his brief in support of
his position. Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney
fees upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and

Judgments of the trial court should be affirmed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the valuation and disposition of the marital residence. The trial
court considered the facts in the record and made the required findings
necessary in valuing and disposing of the marital residence. The trial court
was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the value of the
marital residence. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than his
mere dissatisfaction with the award does not show an abuse of discretion by
the trial court valuing and dividing the marital residence.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindingsand has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
valuation and division of the marital residence should be affirmed.

The

Appellee should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon this
appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the findings and the disposition of the joint American Funds
account.

The trial court considered and addressed the facts in the record
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

(

and made the required findings necessary in determining whether the
account had been commingled and had become marital property. The trial
court was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the parties'
use of the account. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than
his mere dissatisfaction with the findings and award does not show an abuse
of discretion by the trial court by finding the monies were marital property.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
findings and award of the joint American Funds account should be affirmed.
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
The trial court's division of the personal property and single debt
should be affirmed. The appellant has failed to make even a minimal effort
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made
no effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The appeal upon this issue isfrivolousand without merit. Judith Lowry was
awarded nothing more than one-half (1/2), of the value of the marital assets.
The trial court's division of the marital assets and debt should be affirmed.
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
THE ARGUMENTS
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
AND SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY FEES
The Respondent and Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, challenges the
trial court's award of partial attorney fees to the Petitioner and Appellee,
Judith Wanda Lowry. Mr. Lowry urges this Court to reverse the trial court's
award of attorney fees to Mrs. Lowry because Mr. Lowry incurred his own
attorney fees and because the trial court "failed to take into account the
Appellant's own expenses in determining the Appellant's ability to pay
attorney's fees."
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The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to Judith Lowry. In BoUiger v.
BoUiger, 997 P.2d 903 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), this Court held that an award
of attorney fees will be upheld where there is no challenge by the appellant
to any of the findings of fact entered by the trial court in support of the
award of attorney fees.
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual
findings in support of the award of attorney fees, he fails to marshal "every
scrap of competent evidence" in the record in support of the trial court's
decision to award Judith Lowry partial attorney fees and "ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how the trial court's award of
attorney fees is "clearly erroneous." In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991), this Court states:
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
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convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
See also, McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App.
1992)(appellant failed to demonstrate, after marshaling the evidence, that the
trial court's findings were clearly erroneous), and Stewart v. Board of
Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 ((Utah App. 1992)(Once the evidence is listed or
marshaled with appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must then
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable
to the decision).
On April 1, 2005, a month after the trial, the Respondent's counsel
filed an affidavit of attorney fees the trial court presumably considered,
when it awarded the Petitioner her costs and attorney fees. (R. 127-140)
The appellant claims the trial court "failed to take into account the
Appellant's own expenses in determining the Appellant's ability to pay
attorney's fees." The statement is simply untrue and frivolous. Mr. Lowry,
submitted Exhibits 19, and 20, to the trial court which listed his expenses
and was examined at trial upon the exhibits in detail. Respondent's Exhibits
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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19, 20, Tr. 14, 90-94. The exhibits listed his expenses for the years 2003,
"

2004, and 2005. Additionally, Mr. Lowry's friend, fellow employee, and
office manager at Century 21, Russell Gwilliam, was examined regarding
which of the office expenses Mr. Lowry pays, those paid by Century 21, and
the trial court considered his testimony. Tr.62-66.
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported
the award of attorney fees to Judith Lowry. For example, the length of the
marriage (Tr. 10), Judith Lowry's monthly living expenses and income (Tr.
10-11, Petitioner's Exhibits 27, 12), Mr. Lowry's medical condition (Tr. 11,
22-26), Mr. Lowry's social security income (Tr. 11, 27), Mr. Lowry's
Century 21 income (Tr. 12, 22, 27, Exhibits 10, 18, 31), Mr. Lowry's other
recent income (Exhibit 8), the retirement which had not been distributed (Tr.
15-16), Mrs. Lowry's total disability and extensive medical problems (Tr.
18-22, Exhibit 6), Mr. Lowry's expenses, debts and obligations (Tr. 27-28,
Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 28), Mrs. Lowry's attorneys fees and costs (Tr. 41, R.
119-123), Mr. Lowry's attorney fees and costs which the trial court
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presumably considered because they were part of the record at the time of
the entry of the findings of fact and judgments. (R. 127-140).
The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts award of
attorney fees to Judith Lowry. The appellant has not properly marshaled, "in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence"
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
West Valley City v. Majesic Inv. Co., id.
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id.
All of the trial court's findings of fact support the award of attorney
fees and costs to Judith Lowry. (R. 303-327) The trial court considered and
addressed the facts in the record and made the three required findings
necessary in awarding attorney's fees, i.e., the receiving spouse's financial
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees, (R. 303-327), and was cognizant of and considered the trial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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testimony and many exhibits identified above. Mr. Lowry's argument based
upon nothing more than his dissatisfaction with the award does not show an
abuse of discretion by the trial court awarding Judith Lowry a portion of her
attorney fees in the action. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
Mr. Lowry has failed to make even a minimal effort to marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and he has made no effort,
and failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly
erroneous. The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The
trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to Judith Wanda Lowry should
be affirmed. Mrs. Lowry should be awarded her attorney fees incurred upon
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan v. Maughcm,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
THE APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS IN THE
TRIAL COURT. HE WAIVED HIS OBJECTIONS BY UNTIMELY
FILING THE OBJECTIONS AND FAILING TO PROPERLY BRING
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR RESOLUTION
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The Respondent and Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, contends that he
was denied his right of due process guaranteed by Article 1, Section 7, of the
Utah Constitution because the trial court executed the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgment four days after the mailing of the
documents to the trial court and Respondent's counsel. (R. 303-327, 328335.)
"Due process of law" requires that, before one can be bound by a
judgment affecting his property rights, some process must be served upon
him which in some degree at lease is calculated to give him notice. Naisbitt
v. Herrick, 290 P. 950 (Utah 1930). See also, Christensen v. Harris, 163
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(a party shall have his day in court.)
The Appellant's claim is untrue, meritless and frivolous. A review of
the record reveals the following:
The trial court directed counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent
to prepare their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and proposed
orders and judgments at the trial on March 1,2005; (Tr. 94-98, R. 124).
The Respondent, Kenneth Ray Lowry, submitted to the trial court the
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent's Proposed Judgment Dividing Property and Liabilities on April
1,2005 (ft 144-147, 148-160);
On April 8, 2005, the Petitioner submitted her Objections to Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 161-174);
On April 9, 2005, the Petitioner submitted her proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments to the trial court and to the
Respondent. On April 22, 2005, Respondent filed Objection to Petitioner's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 184-190, 194);
On April 22, 2005, the Respondent filed his Response to Petitioner's
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
(R. 181-183);
On July 20, 2005, the Respondent filed his Motion to Terminate
Temporary Alimony and supported the motion with the Affidavit of Kenneth
Lowry (R. 242-243, 244-245);
On July 26, 2005, the trial court sent the parties' counsel notice of a
hearing upon the Respondent's Motion to Terminate Temporary Alimony
scheduling a hearing for August 15, 2005 (R. 247-248);
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On August 15, 2005, the Petitioner and her counsel appeared before
the trial court pursuant to the notice given by the Court for hearing. The
Respondent and his counsel did not appear but had filed a motion to
continue the hearing. The trial court denied the Respondent's motion to
continue the hearing and made findings using the proposed findings,
conclusions and orders, and the objections to the proposed findings and
o

orders of both the Petitioner and the Respondent (8/1/05 Tr. 3-10);
On August 17, 2005, the Petitioner submitted Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments to the Respondent and the
trial Court conforming to the findings and decisions of the trial court on
August 15, 2005 (R. 280-281);
On August 25, 2005, the Respondent again filed his Objection to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments (R. 268269). The Respondent also filed his Motion to Reconsider Rulings claiming
he had been denied due process of law because he was not present at the
hearing scheduled by the Court for August 15, 2005, despite having received
notice of the hearing (R. 270-274);
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On September 29, 2005, the trial court scheduled another hearing
upon the proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments for November 1,
2005 (R. 298-299). On November 1, 2005 the trial court held a hearing
upon the proposedfindingsof fact, conclusions of law, orders and judgments
proposed by the Petitioner and the Respondent, and upon the parties
objections to each others proposedfindings(R. 300, 11/01/05 Tr.1-12);
On November 3, 2005, the trial court mailed to counsel for the
Petitioner and the Respondent the Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which the court had handwritten changes to the
proposedfindingsand conclusions. {Addendum A);
On November 17, 2005, the Petitioner's counsel mailed the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments, revised under the
direction of the trial court, to the Respondent and to the trial court. (R. 303327, 328-335);
The trial court signed and entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Orders and Judgments on November 21, 2005 (303-327, 328-335);
On December 2, 2005, the Respondent filed his untimely Objection to
Petitioner Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments.
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These objections were identical to the Respondent's objections and issues
previously considered by the trial court in the Respondent's and the
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and
judgments, and the objections filed by both parties to the other parties
proposed pleadings (338-343);
On December 12, 2005, the Petitioner filed her Reply to Respondent's
Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and
Judgments asserting that the objections raised by the Respondent were the
same objections which the Respondent had raised twice before and which
had been resolved by the trial court on November 1, and 3, 2005, following
a hearing upon the parties' proposed findings, and the parties objections
thereto.

The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent's objections were

untimely because they were not filed by November 25, 2005, eight days
after the findings, conclusions, orders and judgments were submitted to the
trial court and the Respondent on November 17,2005 (R.344-347); and
Rather than bringing the issue of his untimely and previously resolved
objections before the trial court for resolution the Respondent filed his
Notice of Appeal on December 9, 2005 (R. 348-349).
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The appellant, Kenneth Lowry, does not present nor cite any authority
supporting his position that he was deprived of his property in violation of
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah in violation of Rule 33, of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Mr. Lowry does not make any argument whatsoever in his
Appellant's Brief in support of his position that he was deprived of his
property without due process of law in violation of Rule 33, of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Mr. Lowry has not established that he was deprived of any "property"
at all. He has not specifically identified anything, not a single item, of
property that he was deprived of. Indeed, the properties awarded to Judith
Lowry were her fair share of the marital assets, jointly acquired and owned,
and possessed by her. The appellant, Mr. Lowry, has failed to establish a
principal element of his claim under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution
of Utah, the property of which he was deprived.
Moreover, the appellant Mr. Lowry was afforded due process of law
upon his objections to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and
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Judgments entered by the trial court under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Although Rule 7(f)(2), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that the Respondent, Mr. Lowry, file objections within five days (eight with
the mailing rule), he failed to do so. Mr. Lowry untimely filed his written
objections to the third revised set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Orders and Judgment on December 2, 2005. (338-343). These objections
were the same objections the trial court had twice previously ruled upon.
Mr. Lowry had his days in court. His objections were repeatedly
considered by the trial court and ruled upon thrice. He has not established
that he was deprived of a single item of his property. Mr. Lowry was
afforded, and re-afforded, due process of law. The trial court had heard his
position at trial, twice considered his objections to the findings, orders and
judgments and made modifications and revisions based upon his objections.
The trial court, upon receiving the third set of revised Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments, determined that the
documents were in accord with the Court's intentions in the action and
executed and entered them in good discretion.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Respondent and Appellant's argument that his right of due
process under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 7, of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is without merit and is frivolous and the
findings and orders should be affirmed. He cites no facts and no authority
nor makes an argument in his brief in support of his position. Judith Wanda
Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees upon this appeal
pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Eames v.
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
AND SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
PROPERTY VALUATION AND DIVISION. THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION VALUING AND DIVIDING
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE
The Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, contends that the trial court erred
in the valuation of the marital residence by allowing the testimony of the
Appellee's appraiser and by ignoring the Appellant's $8,000.00, contribution
of inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence.
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the
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trial court's award valuation of the marital residence.

In Proudflt v.

Proudfit, 598 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1979), this Court held that an appellant must
establish that the trial court abused it's discretion in valuing and disposing of
a marital residence in a divorce action. See also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah Ct.App. 1993).
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual
findings in support of the valuation and disposition of the marital residence,
he fails to marshal "every scrap of competent evidence" in the record in
support of the trial court's decision valuing and dividing the marital
residence and "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how
the trial court's valuation and disposition of the marital residence is "clearly
erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991). See also, McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah
App. 1992)(appellant failed to demonstrate, after marshaling the evidence,
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous), and Stewart v. Board
of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 ((Utah App. 1992)(Once the evidence is listed
or marshaled with appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must then
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the
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findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable
to the decision).
Importantly, the both the Respondent and the Petitioner presented
extensive testimony and evidence to the trial court at trial upon the valuation
and disposition of the marital residence.(7>. 5-9, 27, 30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60)
The appellant claims the trial court "failed to take into account the
Appellant's own valuation and his "expert witness" testimony in
determining the value of the marital residence, Mr. Gwilliam, his friend,
fellow employee and office manager at Century 21. The statement is simply
untrue and frivolous. Mr. Lowry presented Mr. Gwilliam as his "expert
witness" upon the value of the marital residence. (There was no prior notice
to the Petitioner under Rule 26, that Mr. Gwilliam would be presented by the
Respondent as an "expert witness" at the time of trial.)
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported
the trial court's valuation and division of the marital residence.

For

example, the length of the marriage {Tr. 10), Judith Lowry's monthly living
expenses and income {Tr. 10-11, Petitioner's Exhibits 27, 12), Mr. Lowry's
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medical condition (Tr. 11, 22-26), Mr. Lowry's social security income (Tr.
11, 27), Mr. Lowry's Century 21 income (Tr. 12, 22, 27, Exhibits 10, 18,
31), Mr. Lowry's other recent income (Exhibit 8), the retirement which had
not been distributed (Tr. 15-16), Mrs. Lowry's total disability and extensive
medical problems (Tr. 18-22, Exhibit 6), Mr. Lowry's expenses, debts and
obligations (Tr. 27-28, Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 28), Mr. Lowry's valuation of the
residence, Mr. Gwilliam's valuation of the residence, and Mr. Morley's
valuation of the residence. (R. 27, 30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60). It was within
the trial court's discretion to value the residence at $185,000.00.
There was no evidence whatsoever presented at trial that the
Appellant, Mr. Lowry, had made an $8,000.00, contribution to the purchase
of the marital residence from his inherited, separate property. Indeed, the
trial court found that Mr. Lowry's inheritance had been commingled with
the marital estate when he placed the funds into a joint American Funds
account with Mrs. Lowry, used the funds to purchase automobiles and trucks
which the parties jointly titled, deposited his earnings into the account, and
used the monies for trips and household expenses. (R. 313).
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The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts valuation and
disposition of the marital residence.

The appellant has not properly

marshaled, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence" introduced at trial which supports the veryfindingsthe
appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., id.
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id.
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage v. Savage, 658
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). In particular, the "[d]etermination of the
value of assets is a matter for the trial court which will not be reviewed in
the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6
(Utah 1982)." Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984).
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All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the valuation and disposition of the marital residence. (7>. 27,
30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60). The trial court considered and addressed the facts
in the record and made the required findings necessary in valuing and
disposing of the marital residence. The trial court was cognizant of and
considered the trial testimony about the value of the marital residence. Mr.
Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than his mere dissatisfaction
with the award does not show an abuse of discretion by the trial court
valuing and dividing the marital residence. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah Ct App. 1993). Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). Turner, id.; Argyle, id.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
valuation and division of the marital residence should be affirmed. Judith
Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan v. Maughan,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
AND SHOW THAT THE FINDINGS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
THE RESPONDENT'S INHERITANCE HAD BEEN COMMINGLED
AND WAS MARITAL PROPERTY
The Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, asserts that the trial court
committed err in awarding the Appellee, Judith Wanda Lowry, a portion of
his inheritance.
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and decision that the $32,045.00, in the joint American
Funds account was marital property because it had been commingled. In
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court
held that once inherited property is so commingled that it loses it's separate
identity it is marital property.
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual
findings in support of the trial court's finding that the funds were
commingled and marital property, he fails to marshal "every scrap of
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competent evidence" in the record in support of the trial court's decision and
findings that the account was commingled and marital property, and "ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how the trial court's
finding that the inheritance was commingled is clearly erroneous. West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). See also,
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992); Stewart v.
Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134,138 ((Utah App. 1992.)
Importantly, both the Respondent presented extensive argument,
testimony and evidence to the trial court at trial upon the issue of whether
the $32,045.00, which the parties had placed into a joint American Funds
account had been commingled and was thus marital property. (Tr. 95-96,
Trial Exhibits 7, and 25, R. 144-160, 170-172, 188, 324-325).
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported
the trial court's finding that the joint American Funds account had been
commingled and was marital property. For example, trial exhibit 7, showed
the funds had been placed into a joint account with Judith Lowry. The
parties had purchased the parties' Cadillac and GMC pickup truck with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

funds and titled the vehicles in both parties' names jointly. The truck was
sold and the proceeds placed back into the joint American Funds account.
Mr. Lowry had put his marital earnings into the joint account, the parties had
taken trips using the funds and the parties had paid living expenses out of the
account.
There was no evidence whatsoever presented at trial that the
Appellant, Mr. Lowry, had maintained the funds as his inherited, separate
property. Indeed, the trial court found that Mr. Lowry's inheritance had
been commingled with the marital estate when he placed the funds into a
joint American Funds account with Mrs. Lowry, used the funds to purchase
automobiles and trucks which the parties jointly titled, deposited his
earnings into the account, and used the monies for trips and household
expenses. (R. 313).
The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts findings and
decision that the joint American Funds account had been commingled and
was marital property.

The appellant has not properly marshaled, "in

comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence"
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introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
West Valley City v. Majesic Inv. Co., id.

In fact, the appellant, Kenneth

Lowry, presented no evidence at trial that he had maintained his inheritance
separately from the interests of his wife, nor did he provide any evidence to
the trial court that the monies could be traced to his inheritance. (Tr. 1-98).
All of the facts presented to the trial court preponderate against Mr. Lowry's
position.
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id.
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable
discretion in adjusting thefinancialand property interests of the parties, and
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage v. Savage, 658
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah
1984).
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the findings and the disposition of the joint American Funds
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account.

The trial court considered and addressed the facts in the record

and made the required findings necessary in determining whether the
account had been commingled and had become marital property. The trial
court was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the parties'
use of the account. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than
his mere dissatisfaction with the findings and award does not show an abuse
of discretion by the trial court it's finding that the monies were marital
property. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Childs v.
Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999). Turner, id.; Argyle, id.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
findings and award of the joint American Funds account should be affirmed.
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
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Procedure. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan
v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
AND SHOW THE FINDINGS AND DECISION ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF PERSONAL PROPERY AND
MARITAL DEBT
The Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, challenges the trial court's
division of certain items of personal property and debt. He challenges the
award to Judith Lowry of one-half (1/2), of the value of the funds in the
State Bank of Southern Utah, one-half (1/2), of the value of the parties
jointly titled 2000 GMC pickup truck, the award of the 2002 Toyota Camry
(together with the debt thereon) to Judith, and the insurance proceeds from
the crash of the 1997 Cadillac Deville, which were used by Mrs. Lowry as a
down payment on the Toyota Camry. He also challenges the order that he
pay the only debt of the parties', the GMC credit card, which was used for
family and household expenses.
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the
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trial court's award division of the personal property and debt. Hall v. Hall,
858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual
findings in support of the disposition of the personal property and debt, he
fails to marshal "every scrap of competent evidence" in the record in support
of the trial court's decision dividing the personal property and debt and
"ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how the trial
court's disposition of the property and debt is "clearly erroneous." West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). See
also, McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992)(appellant
failed to demonstrate, after marshaling the evidence, that the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous), and Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d
134, 138 ((Utah App. 1992)(Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with
appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must then demonstrate that
the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the
decision).
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Importantly, the both the Respondent and the Petitioner presented
extensive testimony and evidence to the trial court at trial upon the
disposition of the personal property and debt.

He made no claim for

personal property at the time of trial (Tr. 5-9, 27, 30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60).
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported
the trial court's division of the marital assets and debt. For example, the
length of the marriage (Tr. 10), Judith Lowry's monthly living expenses and
income (Tr. 10-11, Petitioner's Exhibits 27, 12), Mr. Lowry's medical
condition (Tr. 11, 22-26), Mr. Lowry's social security income (Tr. 11, 27),
Mr. Lowry's Century 21 income (Tr. 12, 22, 27, Exhibits 10, 18, 31), Mr.
Lowry's other recent income (Exhibit 8), the retirement which had not been
distributed (Tr. 15-16), Mrs. Lowry's total disability and extensive medical
problems (Tr. 18-22, Exhibit 6), Mr. Lowry's expenses, debts and
obligations (Tr. 27-28, Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 28), the crash of the 1997
Cadillac, the purchase of and debt upon the 2002 Toyota Camry by using the
insurance proceeds as a down payment thereon, and the commingling of the
inherited funds the Appellant contends were used to purchase the jointly
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titled 1997 Cadillac. (Exhibits 7, 21, 28, 27, 29, 30; Tr. 95-97). It was
within the trial court's discretion to divide the personal property and debts in
the fashion that it did.
The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts disposition of
the personal property and the single debt, the GMC credit card.

The

appellant has not properly marshaled, "in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence" introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Mqjesic Inv. Co.,
id.
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id.
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage v. Savage, 658
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P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982)."
Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468,470 (Utah 1984).
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the disposition of the personal property and debt. (Tr. 27, 30,
43-45, 45-50, 50-60). The trial court considered and addressed the facts in
the record and made the required findings necessary in disposing of the
personal property and debt. The trial court was cognizant of and considered
the trial testimony and each parties' positions respecting the division of
personal property and the single debt of the parties. Mr. Lowry's argument
based upon nothing more than his mere dissatisfaction with the award does
not show an abuse of discretion by the trial court dividing the marital assets
and debt. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Childs v.
Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah
1999). Turner, id.; Argyle, id.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. Judith Lowry was
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awarded nothing more than oile-half (1/2), of the value of the marital assets.
The trial court's division of the marital assets and debt should be affirmed.
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
o

Procedure. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Gt. App. 1987); Maughan
v. Maughan, 710 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
CONCLUSIONS
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
award of attorney fees and costs to Judith Wanda Lowry should be affirmed.
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Mr. Lowry had his days in court. His objections were repeatedly
considered by the trial court and ruled upon thrice. He has not established
that he was deprived of a single item of his property. Mr. Lowry was
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afforded, and re-afforded, due process of law. The trial court had heard his
position at trial, twice considered his objections to the findings, orders and
judgments and made modifications and revisions thereto based upon his
objections.
Mr. Lowry's argument that his right of due process under Article I,
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 7, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is without merit and is frivolous.

He cites no facts and no

authority nor makes an argument in his brief in support of his position.
Judith Wanda Lowry, should be awarded her costs and attorney fees upon
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments of the trial
court should be affirmed.
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the valuation and disposition of the marital residence. The trial
court considered the facts in the record and made the required findings
necessary in valuing and disposing of the marital residence. The trial court
was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the value of the
marital residence. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mere dissatisfaction with the award does not show an abuse of discretion by
the trial court valuing and dividing the marital residence.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindingsand has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
valuation and division of the marital residence should be affirmed. Judith
Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at
trial support the findings and the disposition of the joint American Funds
account.

The trial court considered and addressed the facts in the record

and made the required findings necessary in determining whether the
account had been commingled and had become marital property. The trial
court was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the parties'
use of the account. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than
his mere dissatisfaction with thefindingsand award does not show an abuse
of discretion by the trial court it's finding that the monies were marital
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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property. The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindings,and he has made
no effort, and failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly
erroneous. The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The
trial court's findings and award of the joint American Funds account should
be affirmed. Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney
fees incurred upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindingsand has made no
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's
division of the marital assets and debt should be affirmed. Judith Wanda
Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred pursuant to
Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 2006.

ANDREW B. BERRY,
Attorney for Petitiojrer and
Judith Wanda Lo>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of September, 2006, I served
upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, to Reed R. Braithwaite, of
Ascione, Heideman &McKay, LLC, attorneys for Respondent and
Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry,^atJiX-East-U}Q_South, Suite 101, St. George,
Utah 84770.
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AS

ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #0309
Attorney for Judith Wanda Lowry
39 West Main Street
Post Office Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
Telephone: 435 436-8200

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
JUDITH WANDA LOWRY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 044500246

KENNETH RAY LOWRY,

Assigned to:
Honorable James L. Shumate

Respondent,
—--ooOoo

-

This action came on for a regularly scheduled trial on
the 1st day of March, 2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate,
of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County within
the State of Utah.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were present

and represented by their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Gary G.
Kuhlmann, respectively.

The parties presented their documentary

evidence and witnesses and the Court examined the Petitioner and
the Respondent.

The Petitioner and the Respondent each presented

proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments to the Court and
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filed objections thereto.

THE COURT, upon the pleadings on file

herein, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the
parties and with good cause appearing therefore, now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were residents of

the County of Washington within the State of Utah for three (3),
months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the

20th day of August, 1960, in City of Dalton within the State of
Massachusetts, and have been married in the LDS Temple and have
since remained husband and wife, a period of nearly forty-three
(43), years.

This is a marriage of long-term.

3.
physical

The

affection

Respondent
for

refused

several

to

months

give

prior

the
to

Petitioner

the

parties'

separation and told the parties' children he wanted a divorce from
the Petitioner.

There was insufficient evidence presented at trial

to find that the Respondent was having an extra-marital affair.

On

March 12, 2004, two days after the Respondent had heart surgery,
the

Petitioner

and

the

Respondent

had

an

argument

and

the

Petitioner was driving to Salt Lake to. visit her children.

The

Petitioner called the Respondent and asked if she should return
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home to work out the problem.

The Respondent told the Petitioner

to "keep going North and don't come home."

The Respondent has told

the Petitioner that he wants a divorce.

The Petitioner did not

want the divorce and requested the Respondent
counseling

which

he

refused.

Irreconcilable

attend marriage

differences

exist

between the parties rendering this marriage no longer viable and
making reconciliation impossible.
4.

Four

(4), children

Petitioner and the Respondent.

were

born

as

issue

of

the

All of said children are adults and

are fully emancipated and are not dependent upon the parties for
their support.
5.

The Petitioner

School District in 1994.

retired

from the Shepard

Montana

She receives retirement income from the

State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventythree Cents

($180.73), per .month.

The Petitioner also received

Social Security income at the time of trial in the sum of Six
Hundred Thirty-five Dollars ($635.00), per month, but this sum has
since been reduced by Seventy-three Dollars

($73.00), per month

since trial and the Petitioner now receives social security income
of Five Hundred Sixty-two ($562.00), per month.. The Petitioner is
completely disabled.

She has had six (6), foot surgeries resulting

from peripheral neuropathy, is in need of further surgeries and
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suffers in continuous pain.
fusing the vertebrae
continuous pain.

The Petitioner has also had surgery

in her neck which

causes the

Petitioner

The Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in

present need of cataract surgery.

Becky Torgerson of the State of

Utah

assessed

Office

of

Rehabilitation

the

Petitioner

and

determined that the Petitioner is disabled which prevents her from
engaging

in

full-time

gainful

employment

and

it

is

highly

questionable whether the Petitioner can engage in even part-time
employment.

Becky Torgerson was subpoenaed by the Petitioner to

testify as to the Petitioner's complete disability but was released
from the subpoena at trial because the parties stipulated that the
Petitioner was completely disabled.

The Petitioner is receiving

both physical therapy and other therapy, and the copay cost thereof
is One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00), per month.
6.

The Respondent receives Social Security income in

excess of One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per
month.

The Respondent

deposited

into

the parties

joint

bank

account iaaaBfi^fegJlS tJEZSS&ti&rrts and his social security from June,
2003, through April, 2004, the eleven
parties'

(11), months prior to the

separation, in the sum of $42,265.35, which

$3,842.30, per month.

averages

These deposits did not include his income

from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the Petitioner's
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social security and retirement income.
The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, into
the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage.
July

16, 2005, the Respondent testified

On

that he had earned a

commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and
that all of the funds in this account were his.

The Respondent had

also deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at
Zions Bank.

Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from

Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the
time of trial.

The Petitioner was paid a lump sum payment of Five

Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing upon the her
order to show cause.
In any event, the monies in the accounts were marital
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage
from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where
he had been employed since 2002.

The Petitioner and the Respondent

should each be awarded one-half {H), of the value of the accounts
at Southern Utah State Bank and Zions Bank and all other accounts
existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause.
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7.

The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had

stints placed in his heart and has other medical problems^ jasft
dSaaLLnSi gnn'^^rirjr7^xr!rrjr^r'^ ' The Respondent is presently employed
as a real estate agent at Century 21, in St. George, Utah.

His

adjusted gross income from his 1099, at Century 21 in the year
2004, was Forty-seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-six Dollars
Forty-three Cents ($47,276.43), although one of the commissions
earned by the Respondent in the amount of Twenty-seven Thousand Six
Hundred

Dollars

($27,600.00),

was

an

unusual

event.

The

Respondent's average monthly income from Century 21, alone for the
year. 2004, was Three Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-nine Dollars
Seventy Cents ($3,939.70).

The Court finds that the Respondent's

eaw* ? uc, tdfl £ C ' ^y tj Jf u~i} i r A fa \/
-^outh^-^mom^
is potrr- Tnouoand Five m
la e-tf ^ A
-£ f<p£ djs4

* (jet ViJ/ikJ

hf

1

^

Dollars^

sL^fj

The ri"iMrinni1-nTTr^"in1"iriii t t e d h i s E x h i b i t 19, which purp£SFted
t o i t e m i z e h i s employment expenses.

The Respondent J ^ e ^ t i f i e d

t h e expenses l i s t e d on E x h i b i t 19, were foj^the

that

y e a r s 2003, 2004

and 2005, and t h a t some of t h e expen^elf l i s t e d were p a i d by Century
21.

Several o t h e r e x p e n s e s ^ / e r e one-time c o s t s such as a l a p t o p

computer and automo^irle r e p a i r s t o h i s v e h i c l e which he u s e s both
for employjnerTf: and p e r s o n a l u s e .
than QUO^—err—wer ^ d u p l i c a t e d

Many o t h e r expenses were l i s t e d
(such as t a x payments and aulTo"
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rppairs.)

-JIlt^r^k^A|:l)C)rK]^nl. gribare 1 i rrhmri n n - r m

e x p e n s e on

Kxhil

the spousal support he has been payingL^t^w^^titioner since the

entry of thB^¥^f^nxyT3irV0rder
8.

in this action.

The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three

Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89),
per month.

Her monthly need for financial or spousal support from

the Respondent

(following the deduction of her monthly

security and' retirement
Thousand

Four

Hundred

income in the sum of $742.73)
Eighty-nine

Dollars

Sixteen

social
is Two
Cents

($2,489.16), per month.
The Respondent hasfeteability to pay said sum as spousal
support from hi s *£te»ei^jygaettja ty «Hffgn n^pffy+frraan** j nr.nmp and from-dixs*
effiiafTjy^iCMit in£>pm£L^QLL^

The Petitioner is entitled to

maintain the standard of living to which the parties have become
accustomed ^tod this is a long-term marriage.

The Petitioner should

be awardedftOjaaoanaBtspousal support which should be paid by the
Respondent in the ^ura^^jTrr^

r

per month

on the 1st day of each month hereafter and said sum is to be paid
from and after tteds^a. 1, 2005, A*kx±^< efrary=gg^teff&s&', to the Petitioner
by the Respondent.
9.
residence

The Petitioner

and real property

and the Respondent
in October,

2002,

purchased

a

and during the
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marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St.
George in the County of Washington within the State of Utah.

The

purchase price of the parties' home and real property was One
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00).
owed

Eighty-two

Thousand

Forty-two

Dollars

U.S. Bank is

Seventy-one

Cents

($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the payment thereon is
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per
month.
The Petitioner testified that the present fair market
value of the marital residence and real property at the time of
trial was One Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00).
On February 24, 2005, Craig Morley, a licensed, certified
and accredited real estate appraiser of Morley & McConkie, L.C.,
performed an appraisal of the marital residence and real property.
Mr. Morley was qualified as an expert witness as to the value of
the parties' residence and real property.

Mr. Morley determined

and testified that the fair market value of the parties' residence
and real property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eightyfive Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00).

Accordingly, the parties have

just less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner
paid

Eight

Thousand

Dollars, ($8,000.00),

from

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

her

separate

inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and
real property.
The Petitioner should be awarded the ownership and all
right, title

and

interest

in and to

said

residence

and

real

property subject only to the Respondent's lien for his share of the
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($47,500.00).

The Respondent shall forthwith quit claim

the ownership and all right, title and interest in the marital
residence and real property to the Petitioner.

The Petitioner

shall pay the outstanding debt to U.S. Bank on the residence and
real property.

The Petitioner needs to live in the residence

because of her health problems and shall be entitled to live in the
residence until she dies, or sells the marital residence and real
property.

The sale of the marital residence and real property

should be in the Petitioner's sole discretion.

The Petitioner

shall not be required to pay the Respondent's lien upon the marital
residence and real property until she sells the residence and real
property,^

In the event the Petitioner chooses not to sell the

residence and real property during her lifetime and the Respondent
dies prior to the payment of his equity lien, said equity lien
shall become an asset of the Respondent's estate.
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10.

The

Respondent

has

in

his

possession

marital

property which he took with him at the time of separation.

These

items include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums,
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the
marriage including 3 rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment.
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal
property in the possession of the other at the time of trial.
Petitioner

and

the

Respondent

acquired

household

The

furniture,

fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal property
during their marriage which have been divided between the parties
and which should be awarded pursuant to this division except as
otherwise ordered herein.
11.

Each party should be awarded his or her personal

12.

The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and

effects.

stock benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently
held by American Funds.
although

the

These funds have not yet been divided

Petitioner's

counsel

has

Relations Order for execution by the Court.

submitted

a

Domestic

The Respondent shall
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forthwith

execute

all

documents

necessary

to

effectuate

the

division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but
not limited to, an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on' January 4,
2005,

which

Section 7.

requires

the

Respondent's

signature

guarantee

in

The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required

before American Funds can distribute the Respondent's pension and
retirement IRAs, and the Respondent shall do so forthwith.
13.
Funds

The Respondent deposited into a separate American

account

inherited
Petitioner
tenancy.

from

approximately
his

created

father
this

$32,045.00,
in

1999.

account

which

The

he

claims

Respondent

with American

Funds

and
in

he
the

joint

Thereafter, the Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup

truck with said funds from the joint American Funds account and
this pickup truck was titled jointly with the Petitioner.

The

Respondent later sold the pickup truck and placed the proceeds of
the sale into the American Funds account held in joint tenancy with
the

Petitioner.

The Respondent

also

added

a portion

of

his

earnings during the marriage to this account during the marriage.
The

funds

in this

account

have been

commingled

remained the separate property of the Respondent.

and

have

not

This American

Funds account should be equally divided between the Respondent and
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the Petitioner,
14.

In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000

GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full.
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle.

No
The

truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner.
The present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.00.
The Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy
wheels and running boards to this vehicle the value of which is
$1,000.00.

The value of this marital asset should be divided

equally between the Respondent and the Petitioner.
15.

The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after

the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the
Petitioner,

totaled

the

1997

Cadillac

DeVille

driven

by

the

Petitioner at the time of separation.

This motor vehicle is titled

solely

The

in the

Petitioner's

name.

Petitioner

owes

nearly

$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and
her monthly payment thereon is $129.68, per month.

The ownership

and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired
after the parties' separation by the Petitioner, is awarded to her
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon.
16.

The only debt of the parties is a GM credit card and

the balance owed thereupon is $4,282.73.

The credit card was used
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during the marriage.for family expenses such as bill payments,
Christmas

and

reservations.

birthday

gifts,

airline

tickets

and

motel

The Respondent should be ordered to pay the debt to

the GM credit card in the above stated sum.
17.

The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees

herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars

Sixty-nine

Petitioner

Cents

borrowed

($15,257.69),

Three

Thousand

through
Five

Fifty-seven

trial.

Hundred

The
Dollars

($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the
commencement of this action.
Attorney's Affidavit
charges therefore.

The Petitioner's counsel submitted an

specifying the services performed and the

The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay

is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case.

The hourly rate is

reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case and the fees
of other experienced lawyers in the community and the services
performed for the Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and
necessary.
her

counsel

The Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate
and

the

Respondent

has

the

ability

to

pay

the

Petitioner's costs and attorney fees from his employment and other
income and other assets.

The Respondent

should 'be ordered to

forthwith pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred
herein in the sum, of $»jt-fJ.2 D 7 .-£ 0^ and the Petitioner is awarded
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judgment against the Respondent therefore.
THE COURT, having made and entered Findings of Fact now
makes and enters the following:

J}\A

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court has both in personam

A. C <L6l/fc!

and subject matter
if

jurisdictior^of the parties in this action.
2.

ft

The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the

20th day of August, 1960, in City of Dalton within the State of
Massachusetts, and \ave been married in the LDS Temple and have
since remained husbancd and wife, a period of nearly forty-four
(44), years.

This is a Varriage of long-term.

3.

IrreconcilabJSe differences exist between the parties

rendering this marriage no logger viable and making reconciliation
impossible.

The Petitioner should be awarded a divorce against the

Respondent.
4.

Four

(4), childrerV were

Petitioner and the Respondent.

born

as

issue

of

the

All orvsaid children are adults and

are fully emancipated and are not depe\dent upon the parties for
their support.
5.

The

Petitioner

School District in 1994.

retired

frorfk the Shepard

Montana

She receives retirement income from the

State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars SeventyDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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three Cents ($180.73), per month.
Social Security
Dollars

The Petitioner also receives

income in the sum of Six Hundred

($6^5.00),

per

month

at

the

time

of

Thirty-five

trial.

The

Petitioner's social security income has been reduced by Seventythree Dollars ($73\. 00) , since trial.

The Petitioner is completely

disabled and unableVo engage in gainful employment.
6.

The Respondent receives Social Security income in

excess of One Thousand M O Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per
month.

The Respondent

deposited

into the parties

joint

bank

account income from investments and social security from June,
2003, through April, 2004, the\eleven
parties'

(11), months prior to the

separation, in the sum\ of $42,265.35, which

$3,842.30, per month.

averages

These deposits did not include his income

from his employment at Century 21 ReaJS. Estate nor the Petitioner's
social security and retirement income. \
7.

The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had

stints placed in his heart several years agto and has other medical
problems

but

remains

gainfully

employed. \ The

Respondent

is

presently employed as a real estate agent at \entury 21, in St.
George, Utah.

His adjusted gross income from his \099, at Century

21 in the year 2004, was Forty-seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventysix Dollars Forty-three Cents ($47,276.43), although TWenty-seven
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Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
unusual commission.
Century 2 l \ alone

($27,600.00), of said sum was an

The Respondent's average monthly income from
for the year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine

Hundred ThirtyVnine Dollars Seventy Cents ($3,939.70).
The Respondent submitted his Exhibit 19, which purported
to itemize his employment expenses.

The Respondent testified that

the expenses listed orK Exhibit 19, were for the years 2003, 2004
and 2005, and that many oK the expenses listed were paid by Century
21.

Several other expenses\were one-time costs such as a laptop

computer and automobile repairs to his vehicle which he uses both
for employment and personal use.\ Many other expenses were listed
more than once or were duplicated \such as tax payments and auto
repairs.)

The Respondent also listed\as an expense on Exhibit 19,

the spousal support he has been payings the Petitioner since the
entry of the Temporary Order in this action.

The Respondent's

adjusted gross monthly income is Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($4,500.00), per month.
8.

The Petitioner's monthly living \expenses are Three

Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine c\nts ($3,304.89),
per month.

Her monthly need for financial or spousaSL support from

the Respondent

(following

security and retirement

the deduction of her monthly

income in the sum of $742. l\)
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social
is Two

Thousand \Four

Hundred

Eighty-nine

Dollars

Sixteen

Cents

($2/489.16)\ per month.
Tha Respondent has the ability to pay said sum as spousal
support from lAs Social Security and investment income and from his
employment income at Century 21.

The Petitioner is entitled to

maintain the standard of living to which the parties have become
accustomed and this J^S a long-term marriage.

The Petitioner should

be awarded permanent spousal support which should be paid by the
Respondent in the sum Twcx Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00), per month
on the 1st day of each monrh hereafter and said sum should be paid
by the Respondent to the Petitioner from and after March 1, 2005,
the date of the trial of this faction.
9.

The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21,

into the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage.
On July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1,

2(A)4,

which he had deposited

into his personal account at the State Batak of Southern Utah and
that all of the funds in this account were hisv-

The Respondent had

also deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at
Zions Bank.

Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Oro^r Arising from

Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts ancNcrdered the
division of these accounts reserved

for trial and any\ amounts
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withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the
time of trial. \ The Petitioner received a lump sum payment of Five
Thousand Dollars\($5,000.00), following the hearing upon her order
to show cause.

in any event, the monies in the accounts were

marital property having been earned by the Respondent during the
marriage from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century
21, where he had been employed since 2002.

The Petitioner and the

Respondent should each be awarded one-half (^), of the value of the
accounts at Southern Utah State Bank and Zions Bank and all other
accounts existing at the time ok the hearing upon the Order to Show
Cause.

The Respondent should forthwith pay the Petitioner said

sums and she should be awarded a j\idgment against the Respondent
therefore.

\
10.

residence

The

Petitioner

and real property

and

the

Respondent

in October\ 2002,

purchased

and during

a

the

marriage situate at 1020 East Fort.Pierce Drive in the City of St.
George in the County of Washington within theV^tate of Utah.

The

purchase price of the parties' home and real Yproperty was One
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00)\
owed

Eighty-two

Thousand

Forty-two

Dollars

U.S. Bank is

Seventy-one

Cents

($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the paymentV thereon is
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638\91), per
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month.
The fair market value of the parties' residence and real
property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred

Eighty-five

Thousand Dollars ($.185,00^.00). Accordingly, the parties have just
less than One Hundred Th\ee Thousand Dollars

($103,000.00), of

equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner
paid

Eight

Thousand

DollarsX ($8,000.00),

from

her

separate

inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and
real property.

\

The Petitioner should be W a r d e d the ownership and all
right, title

and

interest

in and

tea said

residence

and

real

property subject to the Respondent's lYen for his share of the
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seveny Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($47,500.00).

The Petitioner shalApay the payments and

debt to U.S. Bank upon the residence and real property.

The

Respondent should forthwith quit claim the ownership and all right,
title and interest therein to the Petitioner. \ The

Petitioner

should be entitled to reside in the marital residence and real
property until she dies, or until the home and real Property are
sold.

The sale of the marital residence and real property shall be

in the Petitioner's sole discretion.

The Petitioner s h a M not be

required to pay the Respondent's lien until such time as she sells
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the marital residence and real property.

In the event that the

Petitioner chooses iiot to sell the residence and real property and
the Respondent dies Moefore his equity lien is paid to him, said
equity lien shall became an asset of the Respondent's estate.
11.

The

Respondent

has

in

his

possession

marital

property which he took wiVh him at the time of separation.

These

items include a refrigerators, television, chest of drawers, laptop
computer, lounging chairs, a W e e n desk, the barometer, a crystal
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing\gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums,
saws, drills and several other \tools, all purchased during the
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the
marriage including 3 rifles, a r e v o W r and reloading equipment.
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for
personal property in the possession of\the other at the time of
trial.

The

Petitioner

and

the Respondent

acquired

household

furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal
property during their marriage which have beerrv divided between the
parties and which should be awarded pursuant tc\ this division.
12.
effects.

Each party should be awarded his\ or her personal
\

13.

The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and

stock benefits during the parties' marriage which aVe presently
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held by American Funds.although

the

These funds have not yet been divided

Petitioner's

counsel

has

submitted

Relations Order for execution by the Court.
forthwith

execute

all

documents

a

Domestic

The Respondent should

necessary

to

effectuate

the

division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but
not limited to an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on January 4,
2005,

which

Section 7.

requires

the

Respondent's

signature

guarantee

in

The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required

before American Funds can distributed the Respondent's pension and
retirement IRAs.
14.

\

The Respondent depositee^ into a separate American

Funds account approximately $32,045.00, whYch he inherited from his
father in 1999.

The Respondent and the Petitioner created this

account with American Funds in joint tenancy-

Thereafter, the

Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup truck with said funds from
the joint American Funds account and this pickupYtruck was titled
jointly with the Petitioner.

The Respondent later.\sold the pickup

truck and placed the proceeds of the sale into the W e r i c a n Funds
account held in joint tenancy with the Petitioner.

TFVe Respondent

then purchased the 2000 GMC pickup truck referred toV below and
titled this vehicle in the parties' names jointly.

The Respondent
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also added a portion, of his earnings during the marriage to this
account during the marriage.

The funds in this account have been

commingled and have not\ remained the separate property of the
Respondent.
should

be

The American m n d s accounts are marital property and
equally

Petitioner.

divided\ between

the

Respondent

and

the

A qualified domestic relations order should issue to

effectuate the division of all re\irement, pension, IRA, and other
accounts.
15.

In November 2003, th& Respondent purchased a 2000

GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full.
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle.

No
The

truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner.
The present NADA value of this marital asset\exceeds $22,000.

The

Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy wheels
and running boards to this vehicle the value of nhich is $1,000.00.
The value of the equity in this marital asset should be divided
between the Respondent and the Petitioner,
16.

The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after

the parties' separation because an accident, not the Vault of the
Petitioner,

totaled

the

1997

Cadillac

DeVille

drivW

by

the

Petitioner at the time of separation.

This motor vehicle Vs titled

solely in the

The

Petitioner's

name.

Petitioner
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owes\ nearly

$7,000.00, to Box Elder ^Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and
her monthly payment therein is $129.68, per month.

The ownership

and all right, title and Viterest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired
after the parties' separation* by the Petitioner is awarded to her
and she is ordered to pay the tiebt thereupon.
17.

The only debt of Wie parties is a GM credit card and

the balance owed thereupon is $4,^2.73.

The credit card was used

during the marriage for family expenses such as bill payments,
Christmas

and

reservations.

birthday

gifts,

aarline

tickets

and

motel

The Respondent should beVordered to pay the debt to

the GM credit card in the above stated s\im.
18.

The Petitioner has incurredNcqsts and attorney fees

herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two\ Hundred
Dollars

Sixty-nine

Petitioner

Cents

borrowed

Three

($15,257.69),
Thousand

through

Fifty-seven

trial.

Five \ Hundred

The
Dollars

($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to h4r counsel at the
commencement of this action.

The Petitioner's counsel submitted an

Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed
charges therefore.

The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay

is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case.
The
circumstances

and the

hourly
of this

rate

is

reasonable

case and the

fees

in

V
light\ of

of other
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the

experienced

lawyers

in the

community

and

the

services

performed

for

Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and necessary.

the
The

Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate her counsel and
the Respondent has the ability to pay the Petitioner's costs and
attorney fees from his employment and other income and assets.
The Respondent should be ordered to pay the Petitioner's
costs and attorney fees incurred\herein in the sum of $15,257.69,
and

the

Petitioner

should

be

awarded

judgment

against

the

Respondent therefore augmented by tfte costs and attorney

fees

incurred in the collection of the. judgments entered herein.
DATED this

day of Augikt, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE,
Fifth Judicial District Court
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /y
day of August, 2005,
I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to Gary G. Kuhlmann, Attorney for Respondent, at
113 East 200 North, Suite 1, Posy^fficS^Ttes^lOSSV, St. George,
Utah 84791.
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